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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enjoys a reputation
envied by many other regulatory bodies for its ability to shape develop-
ments in the area of its expertise-the federal securities laws. While the
SEC traditionally viewed the securities statutes as remedial, recent develop-
ments make it clear that the SEC now considers them, as amended, to be
penal in nature. As a consequence, many commentators question whether
Congress and the courts should continue to afford the SEC the same
deference as in the past to interpret the federal securities laws.
The primary vehicle used by the SEC to enunciate its views on the law
and certain policy matters has been through the initiation of enforcement
cases, the vast majority of which settle prior to adjudication. Because the
statutes for which the SEC is responsible have become increasingly penal,
this Article questions whether the SEC should continue to have as much
latitude as it was afforded in the past to influence the development of
federal securities laws. To ensure the SEC's continued vitality and to
protect persons subject to its authority from the potential for overreaching,
this Article proposes that the SEC consider alternatives to the settlement
process as a means for establishing broad rules of conduct. More
specifically, the SEC should establish broad rules of conduct concerning the
responsibility of senior managers to supervise their employees. The SEC's
current position is that senior managers should be personally subject to
substantial penalties, including monetary fines, suspensions, or bars from
* Ms. Flannery is a partner of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and practices in the area
of securities litigation and regulatory enforcement. She previously served as Associate
Regional Administrator for Enforcement in the SEC's New York office and as Senior
Special Counsel in the SEC's Office of General Counsel.
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the securities business altogether, if these managers fail to ensure that the
institutions with which they are associated and individual employees who
report to them comply with applicable law.
Discussion
For sixty years, the SEC has been considered one of the premier
federal regulatory agencies and to some, the crown jewel of New Deal
legislation. The SEC has exhibited a remarkable ability to interpret the
federal securities laws and to adopt and apply its own rules in a manner that
has fostered investor confidence in the securities markets. The SEC also
has found a way to adapt that regulatory framework so that it can be
applied effectively to the rapidly changing investment community that it
regulates. Since 1934, when Congress created the SEC, dramatic changes
have taken place in the capital formation process, the development of global
markets, the creation and proliferation of non-equity and unconventional
securities (such as derivatives), and the shift of investment assets from
individual ownership to institutional control in the form of pension plans
and mutual funds. At each turn, the SEC has devised ways to apply its
existing powers to the new problems that surfaced as a result of those
developments. Although the SEC has occasionally sought legislative
change, it has relied upon existing law in a majority of cases to craft
solutions to these new problems.
The SEC has been instrumental in the development of the federal
securities laws as an advocate in the courts and before Congress, as well as
through its own rule-making process. However, the SEC has functioned
as law-maker in a rather unique way-through the use of its enforcement
program. The SEC can initiate actions against regulated and unregulated
persons either in federal court or in an administrative proceeding presided
over by an administrative law judge whose decisions are subject to review
by the SEC itself.' These enforcement actions provide numerous opportu-
nities for the SEC to affect the development of the federal securities laws.
For years, the SEC has settled the vast majority of cases that it has
brought against both regulated and unregulated persons.' While to some
1. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §§ 15, 21, 48
Stat. 881, 895-96, 899-901 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78u (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992)) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
2. See generally TASK FORCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FAIR AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS,
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extent the SEC and the persons subject to the action negotiate the content
of these settlements, the SEC regularly uses such actions to confirm-and
in many cases announce-its expectations regarding the conduct of large
segments of the investment community. By selecting which cases to bring
and what language to use, as well as by fashioning remedies that require
future action, the SEC regularly uses the settlement process to shape how
courts will interpret the law and how securities professionals will adhere to
it.
3
Through the settlement process, the SEC has developed the law in
many areas with relatively modest resources. The agency's reliance on the
settlement process to reform the law, however, is flawed in one important
respect. Because the SEC is both a party and an adjudicator in settled
cases, its judgment about the proper result in any case is influenced by its
role as advocate. In the case of a contested action in court, for example,
a neutral judge's experience and impartiality may serve to modify an
advocate's more extreme position on what the law ought to be. While a
court would likely dismiss a case with weak evidence regardless of its
importance, the SEC may treat evidentiary issues with greater latitude
because it has a strong commitment to the principles involved in a given
case.
An inherent conflict may also arise when the SEC uses an enforcement
case to legislate changes in the law. Congress, when enacting or amending
the law, evaluates the long-term effect of a particular measure and tempers
the final result accordingly, given its responsibility to constituents and the
availability of debate prior to enactment of legislation. Similarly, when the
SEC uses its rulemaking process to adopt or change rules concerning
compliance with the federal securities laws, the proposed rule is subject to
notice and comment, thereby ensuring that interested persons have an
opportunity to influence the SEC's decision.'
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 13 (1993).
3. See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on
SEC Settlements, 47 Bus. LAW. 1083, 1140-49 (1992).
4. Id. at 1142-44; Letter from Section of Business Law and Section of Administra-
tive Law and Regulatory Practice, American Bar Association to Jonathan G. Katz, Esq.,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission and Paul Gonson, Esq., acting General
Counsel Chair, ADR Task Force, Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 27, 1993)
(on file with author).
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By contrast, the SEC issues settlement orders without any opportunity
for debate by interested third-parties. Typically, the SEC presents
respondents with draft orders and settlement conditions that are nonnegotia-
ble. If a respondent elects not to settle, the SEC initiates an action almost
immediately and seeks penalties even greater than those offered in the
settlement. As a practical matter, respondents confront a Hobbesian choice:
to accept whatever severe penalties are being imposed to conclude the
matter or to face the uncertainty and expense that will result from a
decision to resist. Consequently, the SEC has tremendous leverage in
fashioning the final outcome of the case. Interested persons such as
industry representatives play no role in shaping the content of an individual
settled order even though that order establishes how the SEC expects
persons similarly situated to the respondents to conduct themselves in the
future.
For many years, the SEC's use of its enforcement powers in the
foregoing manner has been accepted as another example of the remedial,
but flexible, approach approved by the courts in interpreting the federal
securities laws. Indeed, as remedial statutes, federal courts gave a broad
and flexible reading to the Exchange Act and other federal securities laws.
In recent years, however, federal courts have looked with less favor on the
continued extension of the Exchange Act's provisions.'
The enactment of the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990 (Remedies Act), which amended certain
provisions of the Exchange Act, provided courts with reasons to begin
contracting the SEC's powers.' The Remedies Act authorizes the SEC to
assess civil monetary penalties in administrative proceedings instituted
against registered securities dealers and their associated persons.' The
5. Compare SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) with
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439,
1447-48 (1994).
6. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-429, § 202(a), 104 Stat. 931, 937-38 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (Supp.
IV 1992)) [hereinafter Remedies Act].
7. Section 21B(a) of the Exchange Act provides as follows:
In any proceeding instituted pursuant to sections 78o(b)(4), 78o(b)(6), 78o-4,
78o-5, or 78q-1 of this title against any person, the [SEC] or the appropriate
regulatory agency may impose a civil penalty if it finds, on the record after
notice and opportunity for hearing, that such person-
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SEC has employed the Remedies Act to extract significant penalties from
defendants in most cases.
A three-tier system set forth in section 21B(b) of the Exchange Act sets
forth the maximum penalty that the SEC may assess.8 The second tier,
which includes violations involving fraud, provides for higher maximum
penalties than the first tier. The Exchange Act provides for even higher
maximum penalties for third tier violations, which involve fraud that results
in substantial losses, creates the risk of substantial losses to other persons,
or results in substantial pecuniary gain to the respondent.
Following hearings on the Remedies Act, the Senate and House
Reports both recommended enactment of the civil monetary penalty
provisions. Both Reports stated that civil monetary penalties would give the
SEC flexibility to tailor remedies to the facts and circumstances of each
violation. Both Reports also note that giving the SEC the power to impose
civil money penalties would increase deterrence and would help maintain
public confidence in the integrity of the markets.9
(1) has willfully violated any provision of the Securities Act of
1933, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, or this chapter, or the rules or regulations thereunder, or the
rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board;
(2) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
or procured such a violation by any other person;
(3) has willfully made or caused to be made in any application for
registration or report required to be filed with the [SEC] or with any
other appropriate regulatory agency under this title, or in any proceeding
before the [SEC] with respect to registration, any statement which was,
at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was
made, false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or has
omitted to state in any such application or report any material fact which
is required to be stated therein; or
(4) has failed reasonably to supervise, within the meaning of
section 78o(b)(4)(E) of this title, with a view to preventing violations of
the provisions of such statutes, rules and regulations, another person who
commits such a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervi-
sion;
and that such penalty is in the public interest.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
8. Id. § 78u-2(b).
9. H.R. REP. No. 616, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1990); S. REP. No. 337, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1990).
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Also, under section 21C of the Exchange Act, the SEC now has the
authority to issue permanent cease and desist orders:
requiring such person, any other person that is, was, or would be a
cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or
should have known would contribute to such violation, to cease and
desist from committing or causing such violation and any future violation
of the same provision, rule or regulation. Such order may, in addition
to requiring a person to cease and desist from committing or causing a
violation, require such person to comply, or to take steps to effect
compliance, with such provision, rule, or regulation, upon such terms
and conditions and within such time as the [SEC] may specify in such
order. . ..
The Exchange Act, as amended, includes strong sanctions for violations of
cease and desist orders. If the SEC believes an order has been violated, the
SEC may bring an action in federal district court under section 21(d)(3)(A)
of the Exchange Act and may seek a civil money penalty." The district
court would then determine the amount of the penalty "in light of the facts
and circumstances" under a three-tier structure similar to that found in
section 21B(b)."2 Essentially, Congress designed this structure to provide
greater penalties for violations involving fraud in which other persons suffer
substantial loss or the risk of substantial loss. Hence, penalties range from
$5,000 to $100,000 for individuals and from $50,000 to $500,000 for firms
or "the gross amount of pecuniary gain to such a defendant as a result of
the violation," whichever is greater.' 3 The violator is subject to multiple,
even daily, money penalties because section 21(d)(3)(D) provides that each
separate violation of the cease and desist order is a separate offense and
each day of a continuing failure to comply is a separate offense.
The question posed by this Article is whether, given the SEC's
decision to interpret the federal securities laws a§ penal, it remains
appropriate for the SEC to rely so heavily on the settlement process as the
primary means of developing the federal securities law? This author
suggests that a modification of that practice is in order. Given the current
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (Supp. IV 1992).
11. Id. § 78u(d)(3).
12. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1992) with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b)
(Supp. IV 1992).
13. Id. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i), (iii).
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SEC philosophy that misconduct must be punished severely and that the
Exchange Act, as amended by the Remedies Act, is no longer remedial, 4
the SEC should expose its contemplated interpretation of a statute for
comment or review prior to adopting new rules of conduct that prospec-
tively affect broad segments of the investment community. An effective
way for the SEC to disseminate its interpretation of the law is to issue
reports of investigations or interpretive releases that do not impose severe
sanctions on individual respondents. In appropriate circumstances, the SEC
should continue to use its enforcement powers to punish individual
wrongdoers, but it should refuse to use such cases to overturn or radically
depart from existing law, particularly at the expense of an individual
respondent.
Prudential Securities, Inc.'5 provides a dramatic example of the
SEC's election to break new ground through the settlement process. In
Prudential, the SEC alleged that the brokerage firm had engaged in
improper sales practices concerning the sale of direct investments to
customers in the late 1980s. As a condition of the settlement, the SEC
ordered Prudential to waive the statute of limitations defense that otherwise
existed with regard to many of the transactions that had occurred.
Concurrently, Prudential agreed to establish a fund of an unlimited amount
(the initial deposit was $300 million) to compensate its customers who
elected to use a modified claim procedure. 6
Although the Prudential settlement contains a number of important
features that will influence how securities firms conduct themselves in the
retail sales area, the waiver of the statute of limitations is also noteworthy.
The waiver represented a clear departure from settled law. Indeed, over
substantial opposition from the SEC as amicus curiae, the United States
Supreme Court in 1991 held that the applicable statute of limitations for
private actions invoked under the relevant statutory provision, section 10(b)
14. See Ralph C. Ferrara, Hardball! The SEC's New Arsenal of Enforcement
Weapons, 47 Bus. LAW. 33 (1991); Anne C. Flannery & Elizabeth A. Corley,
Understanding the SEC's New Powers: Expanded Liability for Individuals and Regulated
Entities, April 5, 1993, A.B.A. Sec. Bus. Law, 1993 Spring Meeting (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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of the Exchange Act, was three years.' 7 In that case and others, the
Supreme Court has expressed hostility toward such private actions even
though conventional wisdom has recognized the existence of such implied
actions as a supplement to the SEC's own enforcement of the federal
securities laws.'"
While Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson'9
sparked considerable debate in the legal community, and legislative efforts
to override the Court's holding remain alive, it is beyond question that the
Court viewed its holding in Lampf with respect to the applicable statute of
limitations to be quite clear. Indeed, the Court emphasized the same
principles-finality and uniformity within the federal system-that
Prudential had raised vigorously, and successftully, in private actions
brought by investors years after the transactions in question had oc-
curred. 0
Nevertheless, by issuing an order that Prudential agreed not to contest,
the SEC, in one stroke, removed the statute of limitations as an obstacle to
investor recovery. In doing so, the SEC accomplished what it had failed
to convince either Congress or the Court to do. Although the Prudential
order is not, by its terms, res judicata in cases involving other securities
firms, the reality is that the SEC will confront all similarly situated firms
with the terms of the Prudential settlement. These firms will face
considerable pressure to acquiesce to the SEC's demands. Indeed, the cost
of a confrontation with the SEC may compel some firms to agree to waive
the statute of limitations in circumstances that are not comparable to those
alleged to have occurred in the Prudential matter.
Whether the result in Prudential from a social or policy-making
perspective is just or unjust is irrelevant. Instead, the question is whether,
as a matter of jurisprudence, such a major alteration in the law should
occur as the result of an order in which the SEC stands as advocate, judge,
and rulemaker. Although the Prudential order was bilateral in the sense
that Prudential negotiated the order's terms with the SEC, the circumstances
required Prudential to consider its own parochial interests first and
17. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350
(1991).
18. E.g., id. at 358; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
19. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
20. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 357
(1991).
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foremost. A strong argument can be made that by agreeing to such an
extraordinary condition, Prudential limited its liability as far as the SEC
was concerned, reduced its exposure to punitive damages in actions in
which the statute might not be a complete defense, and eliminated an
obligation to the fifty state regulators who were clamoring for even greater
penalties. Obviously, from the SEC's perspective, the settlement offered
equally important benefits-a satisfactory conclusion to an important case
that raised troubling questions about the conduct of an important securities
firm and a near-windfall to thousands of investors whose financial condition
might have prevented them from pursuing their own rights of recovery,
even if they could have overcome the statute of limitations problem. The
difficulty with such an arrangement is that the SEC did not receive
commentary from interested persons until it was too late. Conceivably,
persons less affected by the desire to conclude the matter at hand would
have raised significant questions about the wisdom of an SEC order
requiring waiver of the statute of limitations given the potential precedential
effect of such an order in future cases.
The question should be asked, therefore, whether a similar outcome
would have resulted had Prudential contested the case. For example, if an
independent judge had evaluated the matter after the SEC presented its
proof, and if the respondents had rebutted such a record, would the judge
have reached the same result? Similarly, had potential claimants whose
remedies were affected by the Prudential order been given a forum in
which to be heard, would the outcome have been different? Had those
claimants or their counsel addressed a court after a full evidentiary record
had been developed, it is likely that the court's final order, assuming
violations were found, would have considered factors not addressed by the
SEC in its unilateral order. Indeed, a threshold question exists whether, as
a matter of law or policy, a court would agree with the principle underlying
the SEC's desire to obtain such a remedy in the first place. In fact, a court
may even have concluded that the law concerning the statute of limitations
should not be altered, notwithstanding the SEC's policy arguments
supporting a change in the law.
In evaluating whether the SEC should be permitted to direct the law
through the settlement process, it is appropriate to consider these questions,
as well as whether the SEC's position is valid. In fact, courts have not
always been receptive to the SEC's view of such policy issues or, in some
cases, of the law, particularly when the SEC has attempted to extend the
reach of the federal securities laws.
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The most recent example of the Supreme Court's refusal to accept the
SEC's position on such issues was in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. 2 In Bank of Denver, the Supreme
Court held that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act cannot be read to
sustain a cause of action for damages against persons alleged to have aided
and abetted a violation of that provision.22 The Court's decision flatly
rejected the position of the SEC, as amicus curiae. The Court also
disagreed with the SEC's contention that the existence of such a cause of
action was critical to the SEC's own enforcement program, as well as a
necessary supplement to private enforcement of the securities laws.'
The holding in Bank of Denver overturns substantial lower court
precedent and runs counter to hundreds of cases settled by the SEC with
persons whom it had found had aided and abetted violations of section
10(b) of the Exchange Act. More importantly, the case illustrates that the
SEC, when it functions in the treble role of advocate, rulemaker, and
adjudicator, may come to a conclusion far different from that which a
court, upon review, might reach. Put simply, the SEC may reach the
wrong conclusion, as a matter of law, in circumstances that allow no
opportunity or incentive for the SEC's adversaries or third parties to brief
the issue before a neutral forum. This overreaching typically occurs when
the SEC's pursuit of certain policy objectives has been frustrated by
Congress or the courts, such as with respect to the statute of limitations
issue.
In the past, concern over the SEC's ability to invoke new principles
of law through settled cases was at least tempered by the fact that the
sanctions imposed against violators were not substantial. For example, an
institution whose deficient compliance procedures in the retail sales area
failed to prevent violations by its brokers typically consented to an order
directing the firm to review and revise its compliance system.24 General-
ly, if middle or senior management was sued at all, the likely sanctions
21. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
22. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S.
Ct. 1439, 1446-48 (1994).
23. Id. at 1454.
24. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 26,144, 41
SEC DOCK. 1680 (1988); Thomson McKinnon See., Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
20,908, 30 SEC DOCK. 619 (1984).
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were merely remedies such as training, enhanced supervision, and brief
suspensions from the performance of supervisory functions.
25
Since the enactment of the Remedies Act, the landscape has changed
dramatically. The SEC has made it apparent that institutional misconduct,
such as that alleged in Prudential, will expose a securities firm not only
to the penalties identified above, but to multi-million dollar fines and
sweeping internal changes.26
In addition, individual managers are now equally at risk. For
example, the SEC deemed the former chairman and chief executive
officer, former president, and former vice chairman of Salomon Brothers,
Inc. responsible for misconduct by the head of the government securities
trading desk. They respectively agreed never to serve as chairman or
chief executive officer in the securities business, to be suspended for six
months from the securities business, and to be suspended for three months
from the securities business. In addition, the three men paid fines ranging
from $50,000 to $100,000.27
More recently, the SEC settled a case against several principals of
First Investors Corporation, a firm whose brokers allegedly misled mutual
fund investors regarding the safety and return of certain high yield
funds.28 In that case, the SEC alleged supervisory deficiencies by the
chairman of the board, the president, the executive vice president, head
of sales, and several senior supervisors. The SEC imposed suspensions
25. See, e.g., Vieira, Exchange Act Release No. 26,579, 42 SEC DOCK. 1815,
1822-23 (1989) (upon Offer of Settlement, branch manager censured and ordered to
participate in four weeks of training); Boccella, Exchange Act Release No. 26,574, 42
SEC DOCK. 1808, 1814 (1989) (upon Offer of Settlement, branch office manager censured
and ordered to participate in four weeks of training); Smith, Barney Harris & Upham &
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 21,813, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,745 (Feb. 19, 1985) (upon Offer of Settlement, branch office manager
received 120-day supervisory suspension); Mat, Exchange Act Release No. 22,395, 33
SEC DOCK. 1629, 1633-34 (1985) (upon Offer of Settlement, branch manager received
30-day suspension followed by 30-day supervisory suspension and was required to study
registrant's compliance procedures).
26. Prudential See., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 33,082, 55 SEC DocK. 720,
749-50 (1993) ($10 million fine and creation of Compliance Committee accountable to
Board of Directors).
27. See Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31,554, 52 SEC DOCK. 4370, 4394-
95 (1992).
28. See Grayson, Exchange Act Release No. 33,298, 55 SEC DOCK. 1631 (1993).
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ranging from three months (for the chairman) to six months. During their
suspensions, these individuals were precluded from working in the
securities industry in any capacity.
Whether the shift in policy reflected by these settlements is to be
applauded or criticized, it is evident that the SEC has determined that it
will hold individuals and their institutions liable in circumstances in which
misconduct has occurred. Further, Prudential makes it clear that the SEC
will insist upon sweeping measures to compensate those who may have
been damaged by such misconduct. Finally, the SEC is likely to seek
financial and other sanctions against individuals who were in a position to
prevent such misconduct.
Under the circumstances, a reassessment of the SEC's use of its
settlement process as the vehicle for such change appears timely.
Moreover, given the potential for overreaching that exists in the settlement
context, this Article's recommendation that the SEC find a different means
to articulate new standards of conduct is fair. Obviously, the SEC's
enforcement program is somewhat reactive and is certainly fact-driven.
One can argue that the SEC must rely upon the cases it finds to address
general standards of conduct. Moreover, the SEC presumably would
contend that when it concludes on the basis of its investigation that
punishable conduct has occurred, it is not in the public interest to solicit
public comment or judicial review if the affected parties are inclined to
resolve the matter, even if it is at a price far greater than that extracted in
the past. However, affected persons are least likely to have the incentive
to contest a legal principle when the cost of a defense is so high. In fact,
costly litigation and potentially crippling sanctions act as disincentives to
challenging the SEC's position.
As evidenced by the outcome in Bank of Denver, SEC policy may
differ from the courts' interpretation of the law. Thus, the SEC should
consider separating its policy-making functions from its judicial functions.
Assuming that this idea has merit, the SEC should find alternatives to the
settlement process for the purpose of articulating what behavior it expects
from those it is empowered to prosecute. While the SEC may properly
use the settlement process to influence the development of the law, it
should refrain from doing so in cases in which it is clearly breaking new
ground. If the SEC does choose to use its settlement powers to establish
broad principles, however, it should not do so at the expense of a
particular individual. In other words, the SEC should not extract huge
1026
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penalties to make a point in cases in which it elects to alter radically
federal securities law.
If the SEC were willing to explore alternatives to the settlement
process, what other vehicles could it use? First, the SEC could issue
interpretative releases or reports about its investigations without taking
further punitive measures. While the use of these releases remains a rare
occurrence, the SEC employed such a device in Gulfreund,29 in which
the SEC discussed the manner in which it expected an institution's chief
legal officer to behave. In Gufreund, the SEC refrained from initiating
an enforcement action against Donald Feuerstein, the chief legal officer,
but described at great length what it found his role and shortcomings to
be. This approach gave interested persons notice of what steps the SEC
expected such persons to take in the future when confronted with similar
wrongdoing."
Second, the SEC could resume issuing remedial orders against
individuals for widespread misconduct. When the SEC first issues an
order that identifies a new problem, the SEC should not impose severe
monetary or other penal sanctions. Instead, the SEC should use orders
concerning new problems to articulate its views as to appropriate standards
of conduct without unduly penalizing the individuals whose activities have
caught the SEC's attention. From Mr. Feuerstein's perspective, a public
report that merely described his alleged deficiencies presumably was
preferable to an SEC order in which he was named as a respondent,
however mild or remedial the sanctions.
A third alternative, which avoids disclosing any individual's identity,
would be the issuance of an interpretive release that identifies SEC
concerns or reviews certain industry practices. A release or an investiga-
tive report could describe deficiencies and the need for reform without
holding particular firms or individuals accountable for having committed
misconduct. An example of the SEC's ability to release such a report,
which in turn can effect industry standards, is an SEC report issued in
1993 concerning trading practices in the high yield securities area.3'
While issuance of a release would not result in the imposition of sanctions
29. See GuOfreund, 52 SEC DOCK. at 4394-95.
30. Id.
31. See generally DIVISION OF MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N,
BROKER-DEALER INTERNAL CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR HIGH YIELD SECURITIES (1993).
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of any kind against particular persons, the release could educate the
industry as to what the SEC expects in a given area not previously the
subject of enforcement actions. Were the SEC to discover misconduct in
that area following dissemination of such a report, its decision to institute
an enforcement action and to impose severe penalties against individual
wrongdoers would be subject to little criticism. If the SEC were to pursue
such a bifurcated approach, it could fulfill both its remedial and penal
objectives without unfairly punishing individuals who may not have been
on full notice of the SEC's expectations.
Conclusion
Although the SEC need not resort to other alternatives, particularly
given potential respondents' willingness to consent to settlements that
describe at length the SEC's views on broad matters of law and policy, the
SEC's use of these alternatives would enhance the agency's position as a
responsible regulator and prosecutor. This Article merely suggests that
the SEC at least should consider other vehicles to ensure that the agency
retains its preeminent position as an innovative law enforcement agency.
In addition, the SEC may find a greater willingness among the investment
community to cooperate in the fact-finding process and to resolve matters
quickly if alternatives to those presently offered exist. At a minimum, the
SEC can avoid finding itself in the embarrassing position that resulted
from the Supreme Court's Bank of Denver opinion, which struck down
policy that the SEC had followed for years.
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